Welcome to A-Level History! History is about what happened in the past. It's about people, what they did, why they did it, what they thought and how they felt. Our history lessons will help you to understand how, why and when things have changed over time. We will also get you thinking! You will use evidence to piece together the past and develop your own understanding and interpretations. Please complete our transition task by your first lesson back in September.

Should you require any help or if you have any questions then please contact the Mrs Thoulass, Curriculum Lead Humanities
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Compulsory tasks: We expect both tasks 1 & 2 to be completed

Paper 2: Depth study 2H.2: The USA, 1955-1992: conformity and challenge

In the first term we will be studying social, economic, political and cultural changes that occurred in the USA. These include a variety of key events and individuals that played a role in shaping the USA today. From emergence of Rock n Roll, Civil Rights Movement, Space Race to the Vietnam War, AIDS crisis and backlash from the Religious Right. We will be looking at how both domestic and international events both encourage American people to conform to and challenge the status quo creating in some cases creating a deeply divided society struggling to come to terms with the speed of change.

Key topics are:

1) Affluence and conformity, 1955-1963
2) Protest and reaction, 1963-72;
3)Social and political change, 1973-80
4) Republican dominance and its opponents, 1981-92

Compulsory Task 1: To research and take notes on all the American Presidents in office from 1953-1992.

Consider the following headings in your notes:

- Background and upbringing
- Political Party
- Domestic and foreign policies: Aim for x 4
- Key events or issues during their time in office: The economy, war, social change or protest, political change – What role did they play in dealing with these issues?
- legacy

Stretch: Once you have a stronger understanding of the US Presidents during this time, develop your skills further by researching **Historians interpretations** of individual President's and their overall legacy. These include James MacGregor Burns, Julian E. Zelizer, Annette Gordon-Reed, Allan

Compulsory task 2: Written Essay

Option 2H.2: The USA, c1955-92: conformity and challenge:

How successful was Martin Luther King in advancing black American rights in the years 1963-1972?

Using the attached PDF article 'A-Level MLK Transition Task' about changes in society complete the following (20 marks)

Stretch: Independent research – Deepen your knowledge and understanding, find another article, chapter, source that will help you to answer the above question. See PDF article attached *'Historians and the Civil Rights Movement'*

Key Historians on the Civil Rights Movement and specifically the role of Martin Luther King, include Clayborne Carson, Adam Fairclough and David Garrow.

TIP: You may also want to watch highly regarded documentary called ***'Eyes on the Prize'*** which follows the Civil Rights Movement: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ts10IVzUDVw&list=PLOwK3r1sMvSZVth7XGlcpfLSjS3tAp90T

Success criteria

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	□ Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. □ Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and doe directly address the question. □ The overall judgement is missing or asserted. □ There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overa coherence and precision.
2	4–7	□ There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the q □ Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has or implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. □ An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgem left implicit. □ The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	□ There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key feature period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. □ Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. □ Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgemen them, although with weak substantiation. □ The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but pa

Practical based task: Source Analysis As part of this topic and to enable wider understanding, students will be expected to analyse and evaluate the utility of contemporary sources. The aim is to use a combination of the source and contextual knowledge to interrogate its content and provenance (nature, origin & purpose) in order to judge 'How useful…' a particular source is for historians researching into a specific enquiry.

Task 1: To annotate the contemporary sources below. You will be expected to research the time period in order to evaluate 'How useful..' it could be for an enquiry into teen culture in the 1950s.

Source 1: **Elvis' third and final appearance on Sullivan's show** on January 6, 1957, contains the legendary moments when the CBS censors would not allow his entire body to be shown. Seen only from the waist up.

Source 2: Extract taken from a *New York Times* article on Elvis Presley and teenagers by Jack Gould, which appeared in September 1956.

Some parents are puzzled or confused by Presley's almost hypnotic powers; others are concerned; perhaps more are a shade of disgust and content to permit the Presley fad to play itself out. Neither criticism of Presley or the teenagers who admire him is particularly to the point. Presley has fallen into a fortune with a routing that in one form or another had always existed on the fringe of show business; in his gyrating figure and aggressive gestures the teenagers have found something that for moment seems exciting and important.

Quite possibly Presley just happened to move in where society has failed the teenager. Greater in their numbers than ever before they have found in Presley a rallying point. Family councillors have wisely noted that ours is still a culture in a stage of frantic transition. Wit even 16 year olds capable of commanding $20 to $30 a week in their spare time, with access to automobiles at an early age, with communications media of all kinds exposing them to new thoughts very early in life, theirs indeed is a high degree of independence. Inevitably it has been accompanied by a lessening of parental control.

Task 2: To annotate the contemporary sources below. You will be expected to research the time period in order to evaluate 'How useful..' it could be for an enquiry into nature of protest against the Vietnam War

Source A: November 1969, The Peace Moratorium, anti-war protest in Washington D.C attended by approximately 2 million people.

Source B: 4th May 1970, Kent State University anti-war protest. 8 National Guardsmen fire their weapons at a group of anti-war demonstrators on the Kent State University campus, killing four students, wounding eight, and permanently paralysing another.

Tip: For wider understanding and preparation for this, watch Ken Burns *'The Vietnam War'* episodes 4-9 on NETFLIX

Wider reading and preparation for A-Level Task 1: Read **two articles** based on the rise of 'Conservatism' or the 'New Right' after a period of 'challenge' in the 1960s and 70s' and political response to the AIDS crisis in the 1980s. Answer the following questions. You will be required not just to consider the factual information but the Historians perspective and reference to the views held by other scholars.

Joe.L. Kincheloe – ***'Preparing a place for the Righteous: Reagan, Education and the New Right'***

1. What was the theology behind Reagan?
2. Who were Pat Boone, Harold Bredesen and George Otis? What was their role?
3. What does Kincheloe suspect about Reagan's genuine support for the fundamental right?
4. How did Reagan try to win over the New Right fundamentalists at the 1970 Republican Convention?
5. Look up Jerry Falwell, Phyllis Schlafly who are they? What are their beliefs?
6. Why was there tension with the New Right throughout his Presidency?
7. How did he appeal to get the support of the 'moral right' in his speech and campaign interviews?
8. Why did he receive criticism for his initial staff appointments/aids?
9. Why were the appointments of Dr C Everett Koop, Marjory Mecklenburg and the Rev. Robert Billings so significant?
10. What was the first step in Reagan's Conservative education policy? What did he introduce? What did he cut?
11. What were the effects of these cuts in spending on education in urban schools and schools for disabled children?
12. Who does Kincheloe credit for holding back Reagan's desire to cut federal/central government spending?
13. How did liberal's criticise the ideas and actions of the 'New Right'? What did the CDF claim?

STRETCH: Think – How do you think this would affect American society?

14. How did the appointment of civil servants in certain departments become political?
15. Which schools benefitted from Reagan's policies?
16. Which schools were considered the biggest losers as a result of spending cuts? Why?
17. What type of action in schools was considered 'undesirable' by the Hatch Amendment?
18. What was the only issue in education Reagan publicly addressed?

STRETCH: What message does this send to people if your President only addresses one issue in education?

19. How did Reagan address these criticism?
20. What was the 3 Point Plan for educational excellence?
21. How did Reagan use this call for quality to gain support from the forgotten Middle class?
22. How did the 'New Right' describe liberal educational reforms in the previous years?
23. How did Reagan separate himself from previous presidents to appeal to a group who felt forgotten by the system? (Think Trump)
24. What is Kincheloe's overall opinion on Reagan's commitment to the 'New Right'?

STETCH: Can to identify any parallels with President Donald Trump?

Wider reading and preparation for A-Level Task 2:

Jennifer Brier 'What should the Federal Government do to deal with the problems of AIDS?: *The Reagan Response.'*

1. What did the WGHP suggest the Whitehouse should do to response to the AIDS crisis?
2. Why was this particular Memo Review Meeting different to others?
3. What does this suggest about the Reagan administrations attitude towards to AIDS crisis up to this point?
4. What did Gary Bauer flag up?
5. What did Reagan authorise when he signed the memo?
6. Why did the Department of Health and Human Services request the President do instead?
7. What does Historian Brier say about contemporary critics of Reagan's failure to react to the AIDS crisis eg. Randy Shilts

TIP: From your previous reading, you should know who the 'New Right' are, if not, refresh your memory.

8. What do most Historians consider about Reagan's response to the AIDS crisis?
9. What does Sara Diamond argue are the main reasons for Reagan's lack of action?
10. What is Jennifer Brier's view on the ideas of Schilts and Diamond?
11. What does Brier argue that we need to consider in order to credibly judge Reagan's response?
12. What did the issue of AIDS do to political appointees?
13. How were administrators divided over the domestic AIDS education policy?
14. And Foreign policy?

Wider reading and preparation for A-Level Task 2:



Watch documentary - America in Colour 1950s:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkpMju9SzL8

1. How does the narrator summarise the 1950s in the beginning?
2. What had Russia done that shocked the US? Why was this a shock? What did the US government suspect?
3. What were the Rosenberg's accused of?
4. What war happened at the beginning of the 1950s? Why did USA get involved? How was this war resolved see (later)?
5. What was the economy like in America?
6. Where did new young families look for space to live?
7. What was the role of William Levitt? What did they build?
8. Why did this appeal to American families?
9. What did they test in the Las Vegas desert?
10. What measures were put in place to protect people from an atomic bomb attack?
11. What did American's fear about threat of communism from within? Who was Joseph McCarthy? What did he claim? Who does McCarthy target?
12. Who does McCarthy then target? Why was this a gamble?
13. What does the narrator credit as aiding McCarthy's power?
14. Why is it significant that over 50% of American's have a television?
15. What other industry was stimulated by this?
16. How did cars help transform the nation? What was the significance of the vast new road network?
17. What was life like for black people living in the South?
18. What is the significance of the Brown Vs Topeka Board of Education case?
19. How did white supremacists react to this ruling?
20. What shocked the nation in 1955?
21. Why did Mamie Till insist on having an open coffin?
22. How did television play a role in American reaction to Emmett Till's murder? What did it expose to the whole nation?
23. What did black people in Montgomery decide to do after Rosa Parks was forced to give up her seat?
24. What was the outcome?
25. What type of music began to emerge during this time? How did producers try to market Rock N Roll?
26. What happened in at Little Rock? How was President Eisenhower forced to intervene?
27. What was Sputnik?
28. What did USA finally do by 1958? What was the new government agency? What was their aim? Did they achieve this?

STRETCH: Other documentaries to watch: Eyes on the Prize, Ken Burns: The Vietnam War, The Century: American's time





History In Films

Wider reading and preparation for A-Level: Task 3 History depicted in films and television. If like us you google facts whilst watching films based on a certain time in History, you know that films can provide significant amounts of information.

Please see below a list of films we recommend you watch to enrich your understanding of the time period. Whilst watching the films we would like you to do the following:

1)Note down the film and what era/event it is centred around

2) 5 facts you have looked up to confirm the films accuracy

3) If the film is based on real life people, look them up, note down wider knowledge to explain their Historical significance? What did the actors do to prepare for this role?

4) How useful is this film as a source?

5) What would you include to make the film a more accurate source?

Civil Rights

The Help

Hidden Figures

Selma

Mississippi Burning

Suburbicon

Hairspray

The Butler

Malcolm X

Milk

The 70s

Saturday Night Fever

Knight Rider

The 1950s

Mad Men

Pleasantville

Vietnam War

Forrest Gump

Deer Hunter

Born on the 4th July

Apocalypse Now

Youth Culture

That 70s Show

Happy Days

Grease 1 & 2

Back to the Future

Rebel Without a Cause

The Breakfast Club

Stand by Me

My Girl 1 & 2

Boyz in da Hood

AIDS

Philadelphia

Dallas Buyers Club

Straight Outta Compton

Cold War

JFK

Bridge of Spies



1 Civil rights

The 1964 Civil Rights Act gave the **federal government** the legal tools to end ***de jure* segregation** in the South. Racial discrimination was no longer enshrined in law and public transport, universities, hospitals, playgrounds, libraries, museums, privately owned theatres, movie houses, restaurants, gas stations and hotels were to be desegregated by 1965. The Act forbade discrimination in employment on grounds of race, religion and sex and established an Equal Employment Commission.

Congress passed the Act because of:

- the activism of civil rights organisations such as the **NAACP**, the SCLC, the CORE and the SNCC (see page 373)
- the sympathetic response of Northern whites to the civil rights movement
- the feeling that it would be a suitable tribute to the assassinated President Kennedy, who had introduced the bill
- President Johnson's commitment to civil rights and his persuasion of Congress.

The Act helped revolutionise the South in that many public places were desegregated. However, racism could not be legislated out of existence; although the Act supported the **Supreme Court**'s ruling that schools should be desegregated, 68 per cent of Southern black schoolchildren still attended segregated schools in 1968. Although that statistic improved dramatically by 1973, when nearly half of black children attended majority white schools, a process of re-segregation began after that year.

The greatest weakness of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was that it did little to facilitate black voting in the **Deep South**. The problems faced by would-be black voters were demonstrated during Martin Luther King's Selma campaign.

The Selma campaign, March 1965

The situation of black Americans in the South was always worse in Deep South states (see map on page 367) such as Mississippi and Alabama, where white racists traditionally maintained even stricter control than in other Southern states.

Selma, Alabama had a population of 29,000, half of whom was black. However, despite an SNCC campaign, only 23 were registered voters. King therefore organised a campaign against **disfranchisement** in Selma, because he knew Sheriff Jim Clark would react violently to protest. As Birmingham had demonstrated (see page 373), King worked hard to ensure that black American protest should be non-violent but sought to elicit white violence in order to demonstrate white racism at its worst. King aimed to expose white brutality and black disfranchisement in Selma in the hope that it would force Congress to respond to President Johnson's request for voting rights legislation.

When King led would-be voters to try to register, whites threw venomous snakes at them, a trooper shot a youth trying to shield his mother from a beating and Sheriff Clark clubbed a black woman. When the Selma authorities jailed King for his demonstrations, he wrote a highly effective letter in which he said, 'This is Selma, Alabama. There are more **Negroes** in jail with me than there are on the voting rolls.' It was published in the *New York Times*.

The SCLC and the SNCC organised a march from Selma to the state capital Montgomery in order to further publicise their cause. When state troopers attacked the marchers with clubs and tear gas, black activists christened this 'Bloody Sunday'. 'Bloody Sunday' made worldwide headlines and prodded Congress into passing a Voting Rights Act (1965) that transformed the South.

The Voting Rights Act, 1965

The Voting Rights Act disallowed the literacy and constitutional interpretation tests that Southern white registrars traditionally used to stop black voter registration (see page 347). The power of Southern white registrars was decreased with the establishment of federal registrars.

The Voting Rights Act was a great success; by 1968 even Mississippi had 59 per cent of its black population registered to vote. Once registered, black people gained a voice in who represented them in local, state and federal government. As a result, the number of black Americans elected to office increased sixfold from 1965 to 1969, then doubled from 1969 to 1980. In 1969, Charles Evers became the first black man to be elected as mayor of Fayette, Mississippi. Fayette was a small town, but in 1973 two major Southern cities – Raleigh, North Carolina, and Atlanta, Georgia – elected black mayors. The Voting Rights Act ensured that from 1965 onwards, elected officials would pay more attention to the needs of the black population. King's campaign had contributed to great and positive change in the South.

King's changing priorities

Soon after Selma, the Watts ghetto in Los Angeles erupted. This caused King to change his priorities and to turn his attention to the **ghettos**.

Note it down

As you read this section, use a spider diagram (see page x) to make notes on the attempts of Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, the Nation of Islam and the Black Power movement to improve ghetto life. Colour code each attempt to signify degree of success - for example, great success (green), some success (orange) and failure (red).

Ghetto problems

Ghetto residents faced many problems:

- Housing was invariably poor and white prejudice made it difficult for black Americans to move elsewhere. Furthermore, many were too poor to consider moving.
- Poor-quality education made it hard to break out of the poverty cycle. In the early 1960s, only 32 per cent of black students graduated from high school, compared to 56 per cent of whites. Black people constituted 11 per cent of Americans but 46 per cent of the unemployed. This was because of poor education and the decreased number of jobs for unskilled workers due to increased automation. Chicago had 50–70 per cent black youth unemployment.
- The vast majority of policemen were white and racist.

The problems of the ghettos led to ghetto riots and increased black radicalism in the years 1964–68.

The Watts riots, 1965

Black Americans rioted in some big city ghettos in the summer of 1964, but the first large-scale ghetto riot was in Watts in Los Angeles. In August 1965 black mobs crying 'Long live Malcolm X' (see page 390) set fire to several blocks of stores in Watts. The rioting had a great impact on Martin Luther King. He told the press this had been 'a class revolt of underprivileged against privileged ... the main issue is economic'. He began defining 'freedom' in terms of economic equality, called for 'a better distribution of the wealth' of America and planned his Chicago campaign.

Black Americans in the North, Midwest and West

Prior to the mid-1960s, most black Americans in the South considered it preferable to live in Northern cities such as New York, Midwestern cities such as Chicago and Western cities such as Los Angeles. Although white racism had led to *de facto* segregated housing and inferior ghetto schools that damaged employment opportunities, there were two main reasons why life in the North, Midwest or West seemed better. First, black people outside the South had the vote. As a result, there were two long-serving black Congressmen in the US House of Representatives. William Dawson represented a Chicago ghetto from 1943 to 1970, and Adam Clayton Powell represented New York City's Harlem ghetto from 1945 to 1971. Second, black Americans suffered less discrimination in public places. Rosa Parks said that she was attracted by the prospect of life in Detroit because black people could sit where they wanted on buses (see page 370).

The Chicago campaign, 1966

King staged a campaign in Chicago for two reasons. First, although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended *de jure* segregation in the South, *de facto* segregation and social and economic inequality continued in the ghettos. Second, many ghetto residents believed that the moderate civil rights leaders did not understand their problems and were no help in solving them. As a result, many were turning to radicalism and violence. Fearing that this would alienate whites and prevent further federal support, King hoped his Chicago campaign would encourage black ghetto residents to reject radicalism and violence and support the moderate wing of the civil rights movement.

Chicago's population of 3 million included 700,000 black Americans who suffered unemployment, housing and education problems in the ghetto. During the Chicago campaign, Martin Luther King's family became temporary ghetto residents from July to September 1966. His family found that their relationships deteriorated dramatically in the stifling heat of a small apartment without parks or pools in which to cool down.

King's campaign aimed to draw attention to the appalling living conditions in the ghetto and the difficulties facing any black family that tried to move out. In order to demonstrate and publicise the housing issues, King led reporters around rat-infested ghetto apartments that lacked heating for freezing winters or air conditioning for boiling summers, and led marches into white districts where black people could not buy or rent homes. The marchers were met with white abuse and violence. After two months of publicity, marches and protests, Mayor Daley made an agreement with King that the housing situation would be improved and King left Chicago in the belief that some progress had been made. However, Mayor Daley reneged on the agreement after King left Chicago.

The Chicago campaign's significance

Many Northern whites who had supported King's Southern campaign sympathised with Chicago whites who knew that if blacks moved into white working-class areas such as Cicero, property values would fall and schools would decline. Furthermore, helping the ghettos would cost taxpayers money and white Americans were unwilling to pay for improvements.

Not surprisingly, King's Chicago campaign achieved little. It alienated whites and despite a $4 million federal government grant for Chicago housing and a legacy of community action, many black Chicagoans lapsed into apathy. Several SCLC workers remained in Chicago after King left, but one said, 'I have never seen such hopelessness ... A lot of people won't even talk to us.' Some turned

to the **Black Power movement** (see page 391), which contributed to King's increasing disillusionment and conviction that further progress was unlikely.

Nevertheless, King persisted. He sought to broaden the movement by uniting all the impoverished groups in his Poor People's Campaign. He wanted black Americans, **Hispanic Americans**, **Native Americans** and poor **Appalachian whites** to come together to camp out in Washington DC in a civil disobedience campaign that would draw national attention to their poverty. However, he soon admitted his idea 'just isn't working. People aren't responding'.

In March 1968 a white racist assassinated King in Memphis, Tennessee.

King's achievements

King's achievements were great. He played a vital role in the demise of *de jure* segregation in the South through his protests, inspiration and organisation. His exceptionally impressive rhetorical skills and ability to inspire helped to ensure the success of the Montgomery bus boycott (see page 370), after which he was recognised by many as the leading spokesman for black Americans. Although his SCLC was poorly organised and ineffective at first, other protesters recognised his publicity value and those involved in the **sit-ins** and **Freedom Rides** sought and gained his support. It is to King's credit that he was willing to be led as well as to lead. His belief in the effectiveness of mass protest and his manipulation of white violence switched the emphasis of black activism from the NAACP's litigation strategy to mass action and turned the antisegregation principles enshrined in *Brown* (see page 339) into reality. His influence peaked in 1963 with his speech at the March on Washington and his Birmingham campaign, both of which played a big part in encouraging Kennedy to support what became the 1964 Civil Rights Act. His Selma campaign was key in the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

Obviously, King did not achieve the crucial legislation of 1964–65 alone. Protesters, other civil rights organisations, churches, local community organisations and thousands of unsung field workers also played a part. The federal government, especially the Supreme Court and President Johnson, played a vital role, as did the white extremists who aroused moderate white sympathy (President Kennedy joked that 'Bull' Connor was a hero of the civil rights movement). The other black organisations were frequently critical of King. After the Montgomery bus boycott, NAACP leader Roy Wilkins felt that King had taken too much credit, and the SNCC resented his 'top-down leadership', believing it more effective to empower ordinary people. Nevertheless, King's contribution to the transformation of the South was extremely important.

Source A Extract from Ella Baker's recorded interview with Gerda Lerner, December 1970. Baker worked for the SCLC but felt she was disregarded because she was neither male, nor a minister, nor a Ph.D. She encouraged the students to establish the SNCC and warned them against adults taking over their movement. Here, she explains why she preferred to empower the people rather than to rely upon a leader.

> I have always felt it was a handicap for oppressed people to depend so largely on a leader, because unfortunately in our culture, the charismatic leader usually becomes a leader because he has found a spot in the public limelight. It usually means that the media made him, and the media may undo him. There is also the danger in our culture that, because a person is called upon to give public statements and is acclaimed by the establishment, such a person gets to the point of believing that he IS the movement. Such people get so involved with playing the game of being important that they exhaust themselves and their time and they don't do the work of actually organising people.

How much weight would you give to the evidence of Source A for an enquiry into contemporary views about Martin Luther King? Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about it and your own knowledge of the historical context.

King failed to achieve anything significant in Chicago, but ghetto problems were great and long-standing. After 1965, Congress did little more to help black people, but Presidents Johnson and Nixon supported **affirmative action** programmes designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination and to combat current discrimination in employment and higher education. Under Nixon's Philadelphia Plan (1969), the federal government pressed companies with federal government contracts to ensure non-discriminatory employment practices, while universities gave ethnic minority students places even if their test scores were lower than those of white candidates.

Affirmative action proved to be of great significance and assistance to aspirational black Americans in the quarter-century after King's death. He had repeatedly called for affirmative action, so it could be argued that King played an important part in the introduction of such programmes.

In comparison to more radical activists such as Malcolm X and some of the advocates of Black Power (see page 391), Martin Luther King was a moderate. However, in his challenge to the nature and structure of American society, he had been a revolutionary – and, in the South, a successful one.

The impact of King's assassination

The impact of King's assassination was both positive and negative:

- Within weeks of King's assassination in 1968, Congress was shamed into passing a Fair Housing Act. The Act prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing and required the Department of Housing and Urban Development 'affirmatively to further the purposes' of fair housing. However, white resistance made it difficult to enforce and discrimination in housing continued.
- The SNCC had always feared that King's 'top-down leadership' distracted from the need to empower black communities at grassroots level, but while the civil rights movement seemed leaderless at the national level without King, black activists continued to work effectively at local level.
- The **executive** and **judicial branches** of the federal government continued to aid black Americans, mostly through the promotion of affirmative action.
- The immediate aftermath of the assassination was terrifying. It provoked major riots in over 100 cities across America. Forty-six people died, 3,000 were injured and 27,000 arrested. A total of 21,000 federal troops and 34,000 National Guardsmen restored order following $45 million worth of damage to property across the nation.
- It encouraged followers of Black Power (see page 391) in their belief that King's relative moderation was not the best way forward.

The significance of Malcolm X

Malcolm X was significant in that he drew national attention to the terrible problems of the ghettos of the North and encouraged the black militancy demonstrated in the rise of the Black Power movement and the ghetto riots of 1964–68.

Malcolm X's background

Malcolm Little was born to a struggling Midwestern family in 1925. Although a bright boy, he subsequently recalled his teacher telling him to forget his ambition to be a lawyer as it was unrealistic for a 'nigger'. He left school at 14 and moved from Nebraska to Boston. Like many black American males, he worked as a shoeshine boy and railroad porter. His more profitable career as a drug dealer, burglar and pimp resulted in his incarceration in 1946.

While in jail, Malcolm joined the Nation of Islam (NOI), a black American religion that became very popular in the ghettos.

△ Malcolm X.

The Nation of Islam

The NOI was established in 1930 and led from 1934 to 1975 by Elijah Muhammad, a self-styled prophet of Allah. The NOI differed from orthodox Islam in believing that:

- Allah originally created people black
- the evil scientist Yakub created other races
- whites would rule the world for several thousand years until Allah returned and ended their supremacy.

With temples in black ghettos in cities such as Detroit, New York and Chicago, the NOI offered black Americans an alternative to the white man's Christianity. The NOI urged:

- the separation of blacks and whites
- black economic independence through growing food, producing manufactured goods and owning stores
- the development of an independent black nation
- pride in black culture and history in the schools it established in cities such as Detroit
- religious commitment and a puritanical lifestyle without alcohol or extramarital sex.

The religious teachings of the NOI impressed Malcolm. It taught him the white man was the devil – 'a perfect echo', he said, of his 'lifelong experience'. Its emphasis upon the importance of black culture and history gave him the sense of racial pride and identity that he needed. As he told the NOI's Philadelphia temple a few years after his release from jail, 'We are a lost people. We don't know our name, language, homeland, God, or religion.'

After his release, Malcolm became a minister in the NOI and by the 1950s, he was its most effective preacher and recruiter. He and the NOI first gained national attention through a television documentary, *The Hate that Hate*

Produced (1959), which introduced white Americans to Malcolm's bitter characterisation of them as the enemy.

The impact of the NOI

While estimates of committed members vary from 25,000 to 250,000, the NOI had widespread influence by 1969. The NOI:

- increased divisions between blacks and whites and among blacks (Malcolm attacked Martin Luther King for humiliatingly begging for access to the white-dominated world and urging helpless black Americans to 'turn the other cheek')
- contributed to the rise of the Black Power movement, the achievements of which are controversial (see page 393)
- often had a transformational impact (in 1975, the *Washington Post* praised its impact on 'thousands of black derelicts, bums and drug addicts, turning outlaws into useful, productive men and women').

The NOI certainly transformed Malcolm X, although he left in 1964 because of Elijah Muhammad's corruption and refusal to allow him to join the Birmingham campaign (see page 373). 'We spout our militant rhetoric', said Malcolm, but 'when our own brothers are ... killed, we do nothing.' It was probably a NOI gunman who assassinated Malcolm in 1965.

Malcolm X's aims, methods and achievements

Like Martin Luther King, Malcolm aimed to improve black lives through sermons, speeches and writings to advertise problems and encourage change. However, their methods were very different.

While King sought integration, Malcolm favoured **separatism** ('I'm not interested in being American, because America has never been interested in me'). Malcolm believed black people could regain their self-esteem through control of their own social, economic and political lives. As the NOI taught that whites were evil, it made sense to live separately from them.

Malcolm rejected King's advocacy of non-violence, arguing that it disarmed the oppressed. He mocked the Christian 'turn the other cheek' philosophy, saying only a fool would tell his followers to love the white enemy who treated the black population so badly. He felt such Christian teachings were 'criminal' in that they encouraged white violence against submissive blacks. If whites treated black protesters badly, 'the Negroes themselves should take whatever steps are necessary to defend themselves'.

Contemporary assessments of Malcolm's achievements varied. Newspapers and magazines such as the *New York Times* and *Time* printed critical obituaries describing him as a racist and a demagogue. Black integrationists were critical; the NAACP's leading lawyer Thurgood Marshall said Malcolm achieved nothing. Black baseball player Jackie Robinson pointed out that while Martin Luther King and others put their lives on the line in Birmingham, Malcolm stayed in safer places such as Harlem. The NOI derided him after his death. Future NOI leader Louis Farrakhan dismissed him as a 'cowardly hypocrite dog who is worthy of death'.

Malcolm was probably right in claiming that the fear he generated among whites helped the passage of the civil rights bill. However, his greatest significance lay in that he:

- drew early attention to Northern ghetto problems
- contributed to the growing pride in being black
- inspired a new, assertive generation of black Americans such as Stokely Carmichael and influenced the development of the Black Power movement.

Black Power and the Black Panthers

The Black Power movement developed in the mid-1960s. Black Power meant different things to different people. Cleveland Sellers of the SNCC said, 'There was a deliberate attempt to make it ambiguous ... [so that] it meant everything to everybody.' Most white people associated Black Power with violence, but for many black people it meant political and social independence and in particular racial pride. Martin Luther King said, 'The Negro is in dire need of a sense of dignity and a sense of pride, and I think black power is an attempt to develop pride.'

Black Power advocates

A Black Power advocate could believe in one or more of these:

- violence
- armed self-defence
- separatism
- alliance with victims of colonialist oppression in the less developed nations
- 'not ... black supremacy ... exclusion of whites ... advocacy of violence and riots' but 'political power, economic power, and a new self-image for Negroes' (the SNCC's Floyd McKissick)
- 'an attempt to develop pride' (Martin Luther King)
- black working-class revolution
- black capitalism.

State of the Art

Historians and the Civil Rights Movement

ADAM FAIRCLOUGH

What was the civil rights movement? When did it begin and end, and what did it achieve? As time distances historians from the events they study, periods that once appeared sharply defined become fuzzy at the edges, and changes that contemporaries thought sudden and profound seem less impressive than underlying continuities.

The popular "Montgomery to Memphis" time-frame brackets the movement with the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., 1955–68. In their search for origins, however, historians have traced the civil rights movement beyond Montgomery, beyond *Brown v. Board of Education*, and beyond even World War II. It was during the Great Depression, Harvard Sitkoff argues, that "the seeds that would later bear fruit" were planted; by 1940 blacks believed "that a new page in American history had been turned." According to Robert Norrell, the late 1930s and 1940s revealed "not just a few tantalizing moments of protest, but a widespread, if not yet mature, struggle to overthrow segregation and institutionalized racism." Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein place the beginning of the civil rights era in the labor radicalism of the early 1940s, "when the social structure of black America took on an increasingly urban, proletarian character," and half a million black workers joined CIO unions. During the 1940s, moreover, the NAACP increased its membership from 50,000 to 450,000, growth that occurred mostly in the South. These years also saw blacks agitating for the ballot, founding political organizations, and, in the wake of *Smith v. Allwright* (1944) – a landmark decision ably documented by Darlene Clark Hine – becoming registered voters in significant numbers.[1]

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[1] Harvard Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 335; Robert J. Norrell, *Reaping the Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), x; Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, "Opportunities Lost and Found: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement," *Journal of American History*, **75** (December 1988), 786–811; Darlene Clark Hine, *Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in Texas* (Millwood, NY: K.T.O. Press, 1979).

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It is tempting, therefore, to link the struggles of the 1940s to those of 1955–65, downgrading the conventional "turning-points" – *Brown*, Montgomery, and the student sit-ins – to mere sub-divisions of a larger whole. Raphael Cassimere, Jr., an historian and NAACP activist, has even suggested that the civil rights movement began "at least as early as the end of the nineteenth century," in protest against *Plessy v. Ferguson*. Looking at the other end of the period, Clayborne Carson has challenged the notion that "The civil rights movement died during the mid-1960s" to be displaced by a Black Power movement with dissimilar goals. In reality, argues Carson, local activists made no such distinction: the earlier movement to attain political rights evolved into a movement to exercise those rights; both comprised a larger "black freedom struggle seeking a broad range of goals." The trouble with such broad definitions, however, is that in stressing history's "seamless web" they turn history into a homogenized mush, without sharp breaks and transformations. "The people who were involved in the movement in the 1950s and 1960s called it the civil rights movement," insists Hugh Murray. "Historians in pipe-smoke filled rooms ought not to try to rename it." In retaining the notion of a distinct civil rights movement, however, we need to ask: What made it a discrete "movement"? And what was its relationship to earlier and subsequent struggles?[2]

In explaining the emergence of the civil rights movement, the historical context is crucial. There is now a wealth of literature examining the late 1930s and 1940s. The NAACP's legal offensive against separate and inferior education, which began in 1935 and culminated in the 1954 *Brown* decision, has been explored in Richard Kluger's detailed study of the *Brown* cases, Genna Rae McNeil's fine biography of Charles H. Houston, and Mark V. Tushnet's trenchant analysis of the NAACP's legal strategy.[3] Thanks to the work of Ralph Dalfiume, Lee Finkle, Neil A. Wynn, Harvard Sitkoff and others, the wartime years are no longer the "forgotten years" of the black struggle.[4] William C.

[2] Raphael Cassimere, Jr., "Equalizing Teachers' Pay in Louisiana," *Integrated Education* (July–August 1977), 3–8; Clayborne Carson, "Civil Rights Reform and the Black Freedom Struggle," in Charles W. Eagles (ed.), *The Civil Rights Movement in America* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1986), 19–37; Hugh Murray, "Change in the South," review essay, *Journal of Ethnic Studies*, **16** (Summer 1988), 119–35.

[3] Genna Rae McNeil, *Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Richard Kluger, *Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976); Mark V. Tushnet, *The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987).

[4] Richard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," *Journal of American History*, **55** (June 1968), 90–106, and *Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939–1953* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969); Lee Finkle, *Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1975); Neil A. Wynn, *The Afro-American and the Second World War* (London: Paul Elek, 1976); Harvard Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the Second World War," *Journal of American History*, **58** (December 1971), 661–81.

Berman, Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten have analyzed the emergence of black civil rights as a national political issue during the late 1940s.[5] A number of studies explore the challenge to white supremacy from southern liberals and radicals, as well as the more defensive, conservative positions of southern "moderates."[6]

How then did the political currents of the Roosevelt-Truman years relate to the civil rights movement? Dalfiume, McCoy, and Ruetten view World War II and the early Truman years as a crucial period of black progress that underpinned all subsequent advances. 1940 ushered in "a new age of race relations" because the war years decisively loosened the grip of white racism. But Sitkoff, Finkle, Burran, and Zangrando see no great breakthrough: blacks did not turn to A. Philip Randolph's program of mass nonviolent direct action; concessions like the Fair Employment Practices Commission proved meaningless; white supremacy and segregation remained intact; and the South retained sufficient political clout to kill FEPC, frustrate the NAACP's efforts to pass an anti-lynching bill, and wreck Truman's civil rights program. Wynn takes an intermediate position: blacks made clear gains during the war, but failure to build on that progress created a mood of frustration that eventually led to more militant tactics.[7]

Whatever the magnitude of black gains during the 1940s, it is clear that the Cold War ended one phase of the struggle. The politics of the Roosevelt era petered out in the late 1940s as anticommunist hysteria extinguished the Old Left, put liberals on the defensive, and strengthened the forces of conservatism. Yet historians of the civil rights movement have generally glossed over the impact of the Cold War. According to Manning Marable, Hugh Murray and Gerald Horne, McCarthyism suppressed a nascent civil rights movement by destroying organizations like the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, the Southern Negro Youth Congress, the Progressive Party, and the Civil Rights Congress.

[5] William C. Berman, *The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1970); Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, *Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1973).

[6] Thomas A. Krueger, *And Promises to Keep: A History of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967); Anthony P. Dunbar, *Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets, 1929–1959* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1981); Morton Sosna, *In Search of the Silent South: Southern Liberals and the Race Issue* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Charles W. Eagles, *Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations: The Evolution of a Southern Liberal* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982).

[7] Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution"; Wynn, 122–27; Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, "Towards Equality: Blacks in the United States During the Second World War," in A. C. Hepburn (ed.), *Minorities in History* (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), 135–53 (quotation on 136); Finkle, 221–23; Sitkoff, 675–81; James A. Burran, "Urban Racial Violence in the South During World War II: A Comparative Overview," in Walter J. Fraser, Jr. and Winfred B. Moore, Jr. (eds.), *From the Old South to the New* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 167–77; Robert L. Zangrando, *The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909–1950* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 201–13.

And most historians, they allege, falsify history by tarring these groups as "Communist fronts," dismissing them as failures, or ignoring them entirely. The significance of these organizations has yet to be assessed but it may well be the case that historians have systematically underestimated their influence.[8]

The very failure of the Old Left, moreover, had enormous implications for the future of the black struggle. By collaborating with the anticommunist crusade the NAACP saw off rivals like the Civil Rights Congress and found itself in sole possession of the field; with nothing to buffer it on the left, however, it bore the full brunt of "Massive Resistance" to *Brown*, taking ten years to recover. The chilling effect of McCarthyism also meant that the civil rights movement that emerged between 1955 and 1960 – partly in consequence of the NAACP's repression – divorced itself from the labor-oriented, class-based ethos of the predominantly white Old Left. But in separating the issues of race and economic class, the civil rights movement preempted McCarthyite attacks only to find itself without a program capable of addressing black poverty – a weakness cruelly exposed by the ghetto riots of the 1960s.[9]

The emergence of mass, nonviolent direct action signalled the start of a new phase of the struggle. In 1953 blacks in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, organized a short-lived bus boycott. Two years later, the Montgomery bus boycott began, and in 1956 a third boycott commenced in Tallahassee, Florida. Sociologist Doug McAdam has argued that the civil rights movement arose when southern blacks took the initiative and mobilized their own organizational resources rather than wait for outside support. Aldon D. Morris offers a similar analysis but with more supporting evidence. The bus boycotts, he argues, represented the genesis of a new black movement, indigenous to the South, based on independent local centers, and loosely organized around the black church. By banding these "movement centers" together in a loose alliance, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), organized in 1957, functioned as the "decentralized political arm of the black church." With the repression of the NAACP by state authorities, SCLC provided a flexible "infrastructure" capable of sustaining a regional mass movement. According to August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, however, the three main bus boycotts failed to spark off a southwide protest movement, and the Deep South of the 1950s "was not yet a viable milieu for nonviolent direct action." The appearance of SCLC was certainly a milestone, but it failed to fulfill its initial ambitions and struggled to survive. Only with the student sit-ins of 1960 and the formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) – developments largely independent of both the black churches and SCLC – did direct action surge across the South.[10]

[8] Manning Marable, *Race, Reform and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in America, 1945–1982* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 17–33; Hugh T. Murray, Jr., *Civil Rights History-Writing and Anti-Communism: A Critique* (New York: American Institute for Marxist Studies, 1975); Gerald Horne, *Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946–1956* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1988).

[9] Horne, 99, 140, 223–24; Dunbar, 258; Korstad and Lichtenstein, 811.

[10] Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Aldon D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change* (New York: Free Press, 1984);

SCLC and SNCC played a large part in defining the new movement. Both were southern-based and black-led; neither adopted a mass membership structure along the lines of the NAACP, enabling them to avoid bureaucratic inertia but at the cost of instability and lack of formal democracy. SCLC and SNCC injected the struggle with youthful impatience, and they eschewed the NAACP's legalistic gradualism in favor of direct action involving (in theory if not always in practice) the "masses." The NAACP, with its older, more stable leadership and longer historical perspective, felt uncomfortable with the militancy of SCLC, SNCC and the revived Congress of Racial Equality; it also felt profoundly threatened by their mere existence. The NAACP found it difficult to identify with and adapt to this new phase of the struggle. Other organizations now forced the pace.

Memoirs and autobiographies help us to understand the character of these organizations and recall the spirit of the new movement. Three of the best come from former SNCC members. Following SNCC's demise, James Forman, its former executive secretary, wrote a long, angry, invaluable account of his experiences. Cleveland Sellers's 1973 memoir is heavily ghosted, which may partly explain its more reflective tone; it is nonetheless moving and informative. Mary King, one of SNCC's few white staff members, reminds us that she and others in SNCC helped stimulate the first stirrings of modern feminism; she also writes with particular insight and feeling about black-white relationships within SNCC. The autobiography of James Farmer recounts the experiences of a man who helped to found CORE in 1942, worked for the NAACP in the late 1950s, and served as CORE's national director during the glory years of the movement. Roy Wilkins's autobiography exemplifies the longer perspective of the NAACP: the author joined the Association's national staff in the 1930s and headed the organization from the mid-1950s into the Reagan years. Of journalistic memoirs, Paul Good's account of his southern assignments in the mid-1960s is perhaps the most evocative. The memoir of Florence Mars is a rarity: an account of the Schwerner-Chaney-Goodman murders and their impact on Neshoba County of a white woman who, although born and bred in that Mississippi community, testified against the Klan.[11]

Given the prominence of Martin Luther King, Jr., the importance of nonviolent direct action, and the abundance of relevant sources, historians have tended to focus on King and the groups that were most committed to marching

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August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, "The Origins of Nonviolent Direct Action in Afro-American Protest: A Note on Historical Discontinuities," in *Along the Color Line: Explorations in the Black Experience* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 307–404.

[11] James Forman, *The Making of Black Revolutionaries* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 2nd edn. rev. (Washington, D.C.: Open Hand Publishing Inc., 1985); Cleveland Sellers and Robert Terrell, *The River of No Return* (New York: William Morrow, 1973); Mary King, *Freedom Song* (New York: William Morrow, 1987); James Farmer, *Lay Bare the Heart* (New York: Arbor House, 1985); Roy Wilkins, *Standing Fast* (New York: Viking Press, 1982); Paul Good, *The Trouble I've Seen: White Journalist/Black Movement* (Washington: Howard University Press, 1975); Florence Mars, *Witness in Philadelphia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977).

and going to jail. We have a comprehensive study of CORE by Meier and Rudwick, a workmanlike account of SNCC by Clayborne Carson, and a history of SCLC by this writer. There is no adequate history of the NAACP. However, the plodding character of the Association's national leadership, which has perhaps deterred historians, should not obscure the importance of the NAACP's local branches: future researchers may well find that in states like Louisiana and South Carolina the NAACP formed the backbone of the civil rights movement. Organizational history is thus by no means exhausted: there are large gaps, and the existing histories are not definitive.[12]

As for King, it might seem that Garrow's 800-page biography is the last word, but such a view would be misplaced. An impressive feat of research and scholarship – its command of the sources is unrivalled – Garrow's work attempts to let the facts speak for themselves, an approach that leaves the field wide open for alternative interpretations. Moreover, Garrow's own interpretation, which emerges through the welter of facts almost by default, has been criticized for misplaced emphasis and lack of coherence. Taylor Branch has attempted to combine a biography of King with a history of the civil rights movement. Weighing in at 1,000 pages, and ending in 1963 (a second volume is promised), Taylor's massive work suffers from prolixity and the journalist's fondness for anecdote; it is also well-grounded in the written sources. But it is superbly written, and its portrait of King is in some respects more sensitive and persuasive than Garrow's. Branch is particularly good on King's family background and student days. Other worthwhile books include Frederick Downing's analysis of King's personality and religious beliefs, which borrows from the development psychology of Erik Erikson, and studies of King's intellectual development by John Ansbro, Kenneth Smith and Ira Zepp.[13]

Some argue that the proliferation of King biographies, and the "top-down" approach generally, obscures the struggle "on the ground" whence the civil rights movement derived its dynamism. Recent years have thus seen a growth in local studies. These comprise two basic types: studies of particular protest campaigns that focus on brief periods: and studies of individual communities that trace developments over several decades.

[12] August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, *CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942–1968* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Adam Fairclough, *To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987).

[13] David J. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference* (New York: William Morrow, 1986); Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America In the King Years, 1954–1963* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988); Frederick L. Downing, *To See the Promised Land: The Faith Pilgrimage of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986); John Ansbro, *Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Making of a Mind* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1982); Kenneth L. Smith and Ira G. Zepp, *Search for the Beloved Community: The Thinking of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1974). See also Stephen B. Oates, *Let The Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (London: Search Press, 1982); and Adam Fairclough, *Martin Luther Luther King, Jr.* (London: Sphere, forthcoming).

In the first category we have histories of SCLC protests in St. Augustine, by David Colburn; Selma, by David Garrow; Chicago, by Alan Anderson and George Pickering; and Memphis, by Joan Beifuss. A major history of the Montgomery bus boycott is being completed by J. Mills Thornton and Ray Arceneaux (Thornton has already written a seminal article on the boycott). Some campaign studies have the quality of primary sources. Charles Fager, a former SCLC staff member, penned an account of Selma based on first-hand observation. Stephen Longnecker's book on Selma relies on the notes of Ralph Smeltzer, a white clergyman who attempted to mediate the conflict. The Jackson, Mississippi, movement of 1962–63 has found a historian in John Salter, an NAACP activist who was in the thick of events there.[14] The second category, the community study, includes works on Greensboro, by William Chafe; Tuskegee, by Robert Norrell; Birmingham, by Robert Corley; and New Orleans, by Kim Lacy Rogers (the last two are dissertations that have yet to be published). Frye Gaillard, Richard Pride and David Woodward have written studies of school desegregation that combine elements of both approaches: they have a longer perspective than campaign histories but a narrower focus than community studies.[15]

The community study, if properly handled, overcomes a major weakness of much civil rights historiography: the tendency to segregate history by race. Most histories have examined *either* white actions *or* black actions; only rarely have the twain met. Studies of Massive Resistance and southern politics have little to say about the civil rights movement. The only whites to appear in most histories of the civil rights movement are the Bull Connors and Jim Clarks. We need to marry the two perspectives: the civil rights movement involved a dialectic between blacks and whites. Neither side, moreover, was monolithic, and a study of this

[14] David R. Colburn, *Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877–1980* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), which, despite its title, focuses on the years 1963–64; David J. Garrow, *Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of 1965* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); Alan B. Anderson and George W. Pickering, *Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986); Joan T. Beifuss, *At the River I Stand: Memphis, the 1968 Strike, and Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Memphis, B & W Books, 1985); J. Mills Thornton, "Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955–1956," *Alabama Review*, **33** (July 1980), 163–235; Charles E. Fager, *Selma 1965: The March that Changed a Nation* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974); Stephen E. Longnecker, *Selma's Peacemaker: Ralph Smeltzer and Civil Rights Mediation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); John R. Salter, *Jackson, Mississippi: An American Chronicle of Struggle and Schism* (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1979).

[15] William H. Chafe, *Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Norell, op. cit.; Robert G. Corley, "The Quest for Racial Harmony: Race Relations in Birmingham, Alabama, 1947–1963," Ph.D., University of Virginia, 1979; Kim Lacy Rogers, "Humanity and Desire: Civil Rights Leaders and the Desegregation of New Orleans, 1954–1966," Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1982; Frye Gaillard, *The Dream Long Deferred* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Richard A. Pride and J. David Woodward, *The Burden of Busing: The Politics of Desegregation in Nashville, Tennessee* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985).

dialectic enables us to escape from the stereotypes that have too often reduced history to a simple-minded morality play. Norrell and Chafe, for example, portray relationships both within each community and between each community with admirable sensitivity.[16]

The growing popularity of oral history has also directed our attention toward local movements. In fact, oral history is relevant to every aspect of the civil rights movement – historians have interviewed federal judges, government officials, politicians, civil rights activists of every rank, and even members of lynch mobs. It is nonetheless true that oral history is especially useful for rescuing local struggles from comparative obscurity and exploring the role of "grass roots" activists who left little in the way of written documents. Historians can be led astray, however, if they neglect written sources or fail to treat their interviews critically, faults that have marred several otherwise excellent works.[17]

It would be a pity if in their enthusiasm for local studies scholars become afflicted by the historian's equivalent of "local people-itis" – the tendency of SNCC workers to romanticize and idealize the indigenous black poor. Emphasis on the purely local can lead to insularity and incoherence. Local struggles had a state, regional and national context, and these intersected in complex ways. Each state had a distinctive political culture – a fact long familiar to disciples of V. O. Key – which often affected the way local communities responded to black protest. Yet many historians of the civil rights movement have written as if state politics mattered little. State studies may offer a fruitful perspective that avoids the tendency of community studies to fragment our knowledge while retaining a sense of the movement's diversity and local roots. John Dittmer's forthcoming work on the civil rights movement in Mississippi will doubtless provide a yardstick for assessing the utility of this approach.[18]

[16] The best studies of Massive Resistance are Numan V. Bartley, *The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Neil R. McMillen, *The Citizen's Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971); and James W. Ely, *The Crisis of Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976). Two works that do attempt to incorporate the black perspective are Glen Jeansonne, *Leander Perez: Boss of the Delta* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977); and Tom R. Wagy, *LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985).

[17] Kim Lacy Rogers, "Oral History and the History of the Civil Rights Movement," *Journal of American History*, **75** (September 1988), 567–76; Raines, *My Soul is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977) consists almost entirely of interview extracts. David J. Garrow's *Bearing The Cross* is perhaps the work that most successfully integrates extensive interviewing with mastery of the written sources. George Lipsitz, *A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988) is an interesting attempt to use both oral history and documents to analyze the civil rights movement from the viewpoint of an obscure activist.

[18] Dittmer has anticipated some of his findings in "The Politics of the Mississippi Movement," in Eagles, 65–93.

Local struggles were also affected by national influences and institutions. As Steven F. Lawson has argued, the dichotomy between "local" and "national" is a false one: while independently-led local movements comprised the backbone of the black struggle, they could rarely pursue their goals effectively without reference to the federal government or without help from national organizations. For example, the Bogalusa Voters League, one of the most dynamic local movements of them all, sought assistance from CORE and the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee; it negotiated with the Crown-Zellerbach Corporation and the paper unions; and it achieved important court victories with the aid of the Department of Justice and Federal Judge Herbert W. Christenberry.[19]

The relationship between the civil rights movement and Big Business has aroused much scholarly interest. During the 1960s many liberals and some Marxists contended that industrialization and urbanization were gradually undermining the economic basis of white supremacy. As far back as 1951, however, Samuel Lubell argued that industrialization, accompanied by systematic job discrimination, was marginalizing black labor and actually strengthening white supremacy. Comparing the Southern states with South Africa, John Cell and Stanley Greenberg found that racial segregation, far from being a pre-industrial vestige, was actually a product of industrial capitalism. Community studies have found little evidence of southern businessmen actively promoting desegregation: as Tony Badger has argued in a review of recent research, the most that can be said is that businessmen comprised the weakest link in the segregationist chain. In some communities they reluctantly acquiesced in desegregation rather than face political and economic instability, but in others they abdicated all responsibility for preserving racial peace. Moreover, only the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and continuing federal pressure induced – nay compelled – businessmen to address their racist policies.[20]

It was pressure from the civil rights movement itself, of course, that prompted federal action against Jim Crow. Historians disagree, however, as to if, when, and why the federal government became the movement's active ally. The federal judiciary, for example, has been praised for its courage and leadership by Jack Bass, Charles Hamilton, Lucy McGough, and Frank Reed. J. Harvie Wilkinson and Mark Tushnet, on the other hand, accuse the judges of timidity and

[19] Steven F. Lawson, "Commentary," in Eagles, 34–35.

[20] Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 118–20; Stanley B. Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development: South Africa in Comparative Perspective* (Johannesburg: Rowan Press, 1980); John W. Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Elizabeth Jacoway and David R. Colburn (eds.), *Southern Businessmen and Desegregation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1882); James C. Cobb, *The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936–1980* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Steven M. Gelber, *Black Men and Businessmen: The Growing Awareness of a Social Responsibility* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1974); Tony Badger, "Segregation and the Southern Business Elite," *Journal of American Studies*, **18** (1984), 105–9.

inconsistency, arguing that judicial pronouncements had little impact until the upsurge of direct action in the early 1960s produced strong federal legislation.[21] Assessments of presidential performance are similarly divergent; Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson have been subjected to both sympathetic and critical analyses. It is exceedingly difficult, however, to judge their records by any "objective" standard: whether one concludes "should have done better" or "did quite well under the circumstances" seems largely a matter of the historian's philosophy and temperament. Historians have generally disparaged the civil rights record of Congress, although a few have dissected its operations with understanding if not sympathy.[22] Perhaps the most useful means of judging federal performance is to study a single issue during several administrations, a method skilfully employed in Steven Lawson's studies of voting rights, Catherine Barnes's history of desegregation on trains and buses, and Michal Belknap's analysis of federal policy toward southern violence.[23]

The decline of racist violence is one of the least-noted aspects of the civil rights struggle. The notoriety of Jim Clark, Bull Connor, and the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan obscures the fact that the violence inflicted upon the civil rights movement, although shocking, was mild compared to the vicious repression of fifty or even twenty years earlier. Lynching, common in the 1930s, became a rarity after the Second World War – partly a result of the anti-lynching crusades that have been studied by Jacquelyn Hall and Robert Zangrando. To appreciate the changed climate it is instructive to compare, for example, the 1934 lynching of Claude Neal, analyzed by James McGovern, with the 1959 lynching of Mack Parker, recounted by Howard Smead. In 1934 the Department of Justice refused to act on Neal's murder, even though the victim was kidnapped, transported

[21] Jack Bass, *Unlikely Heroes* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981); Lucy S. McGough and Frank T. Read, *Let Them Be Judged: The Judicial Integration of the Deep South* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1978); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, *From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration, 1954–1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Charles V. Hamilton, "Federal Law and the Courts in the Civil Rights Movement," and Mark V. Tushnet, "Commentary," in Eagles, 97–125.

[22] Generally critical: Robert F. Burk, *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984); Victor S. Navasky, *Kennedy Justice* (New York: Atheneum, 1971); John Herbers, *The Lost Priority: What Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in America?* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970) (Johnson); generally sympathetic: James C. Duram, *A Moderate Among Extremists: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the School Desegregation Crisis* (Chicago: 1981); Michael S. Mayer, "With Much Deliberation and Some Speed: Eisenhower and the *Brown* Decision," *Journal of Southern History*, **52** (February 1986), 43–76; Carl M. Brauer, *John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). For Congress see Garrow, *Protest at Selma*; Charles and Barbara Whalen, *The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act* (Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1985).

[23] Steven F. Lawson, *Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944–1969* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), and *In Pursuit of Power: Southern Blacks and Electoral Politics, 1965–1982* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Catherine A. Barnes, *Journey from Jim Crow: The Desegregation of Southern Transit* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Michal R. Belknap, *Federal Law and Southern Order: Racial Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-Brown South* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987).

across state lines, and tortured to death by a Florida mob in a lynching that had been widely advertised beforehand. In 1959, by contrast, the Parker lynching in Mississippi prompted an FBI investigation involving 60 agents. By the 1950s, as Stephen Whitfield illustrates in his study of the earlier Emmett Till case, every lynching provoked national and international outrage.[24]

The decline of overt violence, paradoxically, posed tactical problems for the civil rights movement. Mass nonviolent direct action could only have emerged in the context of growing restraint on the part of the white authorities, but that restraint indicated a shift to "legal" repression rather than any abandonment of white supremacy. And, as James Ely and Steven Barkan have argued, "legal" repression proved a most efficient method of stifling nonviolent protest. It was only by targeting and publicizing the most violent white supremacists that the civil rights movement found an effective counter-strategy that compelled federal intervention. It took the violence of Birmingham and Selma to produce effective civil rights laws, and the murder of civil rights workers in Mississippi and Alabama to prompt a crackdown on Klan terrorism.[25]

What did the civil rights movement achieve? With a few exceptions, historians and political scientists are more likely to stress what it failed to achieve. School desegregation did not yield the social and educational dividends envisaged by its supporters, who often erased segregation de jure only to see it transmuted into segregation de facto. The integration of public accommodations has been far less significant than once thought. The enfranchisement of southern blacks has not upset white domination of state politics. A distressing number of blacks suffer from poverty, crime, drugs, and family breakdown. White racism still pervades society, North and South. And as its latest historian demonstrates, the Ku Klux Klan is alive and still deadly.[26]

[24] Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, *Revolt Against Chivalry: Jesse Daniel Ames and the Women's Campaign Against Lynching* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Zangrando, *The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching*; James R. McGovern, *Anatomy of a Lynching: The Killing of Claude Neal* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Howard Smead, *Blood Justice: The Lynching of Mack Charles Parker* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Stephen J. Whitfield, *A Death in the Delta: The Story of Emmett Till* (New York: Free Press, 1988). See also Herbert Shapiro, *White Violence and Black Response: From Reconstruction to Montgomery* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988). Shapiro has promised another volume covering the 1960s.

[25] James W. Ely, "Demonstrations and the Law: Danville as a Test Case," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, **27** (October 1974), 927–68; Steven E. Barkan, *Protesters on Trial: Criminal Justice in the Southern Civil Rights and Vietnam Antiwar Movements* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985).

[26] In addition to the works cited above, see Raymond Wolters, *The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984); Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, *Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); Alexander P. Lamis, *The Two-Party South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Wyn Craig Wade. *The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). For more optimistic (and journalistic) assessments, see Gaillard, *The Dream Long Deferred*; Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Margaret Edds, *Free at Last* (New York: Adler and Adler, 1987).

Writing in this *Journal*, George Rehin reviewed some of the recent books about the civil rights movement and assessed the present state of the subject's historiography. Clearly, there is much to be done. With their fondness for neat chains of cause and effect, historians have neglected the distinctive culture of the civil rights movement, and its subjective political, emotional, religious, and psychological dimensions. In a suggestive article, Richard King has stressed the need to understand how participation in the movement transformed the consciousness of individuals. Memoirs are drawing our attention to the substantial contribution that women made to the movement, both as leaders and supporters. We need to know more about the role of the churches, both black and white. The function of music and song cries out for analysis.[27]

Even within more traditional perspectives, there are large gaps. We are only beginning to understand how the FBI influenced the black struggle for good or ill. David Garrow and Kenneth O'Reilly have laid a solid foundation, but the staggering quantity of FBI documents potentially available through the Freedom of Information Act will keep historians occupied for many years to come. The NAACP is virtually uncharted territory, and the same is true of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund – incredibly, we have no adequate biography of that civil rights giant, Thurgood Marshall. We not only need more studies of school desegregation at the local level, but also a concise history of *Brown*'s overall impact. Similarly, although historians will certainly add to our understanding of the civil rights movement in particular states and communities, a broad overview is sorely needed. Harvard Sitkoff, Manning Marable, Jack Bloom, and Robert Weisbrot have each written useful surveys – Bloom provides historical sweep, Marable polemical bite, Sitkoff and Weisbrot narrative verve. But none provides a balanced synthesis of the most recent scholarship. In the absence of the latter, the relatively short volume edited by Charles Eagles – a collection of conference papers – provides the most stimulating introduction to the subject.[28]

[27] George Rehin, "Of Marshalls, Myrdals and Kings: Some Recent Books about the Second Reconstruction," *Journal of American Studies*, **22** (April 1988), 87–103; Richard H. King, "Citizenship and Self-Respect: The Experience of Politics in the Civil Rights Movement," ibid., 7–24; Doug McAdam, *Freedom Summer* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); David J. Garrow (ed.), *The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who Started It: The Memoir of Jo Ann Gibson Robinson* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987); Cynthia S. Brown (ed.), *Ready From Within: Septima Clark and the Civil Rights Movement* (Navarro, CA: Wild Trees Press, 1986); Guy and Candie Carawan, "'Freedom in the Air': An Overview of the Songs of the Civil Rights Movement"; Bernice Johnson Reagon, "The Lined Hymn as a Song of Freedom," both in *Black Music Research Bulletin*, **12** (Spring 1990), 1–8.

[28] David J. Garrow, *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From "Solo" to Memphis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981); Kenneth O'Reilly, *"Racial Matters": The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960–1972* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Harvard Sitkoff, *The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954–1980* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981); Marable, *Race, Reform and Rebellion*; Jack M. Bloom, *Race, Class, and the Civil Rights Movement* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); Robert Weisbrot, *Freedom Bound: A History of America's Civil Rights Movement* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990); Eagles, *The Civil Rights Movement in America*.

Preparing a Place for the Righteous: Reagan, Education, and the New Right

The future of the New Right and its influence on American education is closely connected with the popularity and the appeal of Ronald Reagan. President Reagan serves as the linchpin between more moderate Americans and the New Right. In order to understand what may happen with the New Right and American education, one must examine Reagan's relationship with the right-wingers and his perspectives on New Right theology and political thought.

The Real Ronald Reagan

Contrary to more popular assumptions, the American public knows very little about the true theological, social, political, and educational perspectives of Ronald Reagan. Sure, we get a glimpse now and then, but the President has effectively hidden many of his perspectives from mainstream Americans. Does he share a right-wing, fundamentalist social vision with its romantic assumptions of a world of good versus evil? Does he see the public schools as a battleground where these forces of good and evil fight for the minds of American youth? These are difficult questions to answer fully, for the data is insufficient. One of the President's skills as the great communicator has been to evade penetrating questions aimed at determining his real view. The determination of Reagan's stance is important because of the position of leadership he holds with the American public—a position unparalleled in recent American history. Ronald Reagan leads the American people—what is the vision toward which he is leading them?

One incident which grants insight into either a Reagan who accepts the fundamentalist, right-wing cosmology or an incredibly hypocritical Reagan was described by the Rev. Harold Bredesen, a member of the board of directors of the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN). Near the end of

Reagan's first term as governor of California, Bredesen told of a conversation which took place at Reagan's home, in which the then Governor spoke of Biblical prophecies that have been fulfilled. "His closeness to the Lord impressed me very much," Bredesen continued, and he seemed to live his life in accordance with the scriptures. That afternoon Bredesen, Pat Boone, and George Otis (another well-known fundamental broadcaster) joined hands with Reagan and they all began to pray. Soon the prayer turned to prophecy. Bredesen claimed that God told the group that if Reagan would follow his way that he would put Reagan in 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue. (Of course, the White House is 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.) Reagan was "electrified," Bredesen said. "I had his right hand and . . . it was wobbling like this. Honestly, I've never seen an arm wave so under the annointing of God." Pat Boone called Reagan after the 1980 election and asked him if he remembered that day. The president-elect responded, "Do I ever!?"[1]

While the incident is revealing, it still does not answer the questions about Reagan's personal view of the fundamental right. Was he just using them for political advantage, or did he share their cosmology? Never an avid churchgoer, Reagan has an ambiguous religious record. Even the fundamentalist right-wingers themselves disagree over Reagan's theological intentions. Part of this distrust, of course, may have resulted from his "suspect" theatrical background and his divorce. But much of the suspicion was derived from Reagan's priorities as a politician.

The distrust manifested itself in the 1980 campaign, as many fundamental right-wingers threw their early support to Phillip Crane and John Connally. The distrust had resulted from Reagan's appeals to moderates between the 1976 campaign and 1980. New Right fundamentalists had not forgotten his attempts at the 1976 convention to reach out to centrist Republicans. In order to solidify fundamental, right-wing support, Reagan realized that he must prove himself. Thus, he courted the fundamentalists at the 1980 Republican convention, emphasizing his adoption of their social and education agendas. In his convention suite at Detroit he entertained Jesse Helms, Jerry Falwell, Phyllis Schlafly, and New Right strategist Howard Phillips. Considering themselves the soul of Reagan's campaign, the fundamentalists felt betrayed when Reagan selected moderate George Bush as his running mate.

The tension between Reagan and the fundamentalist New Right has continued through his Presidency, as Reagan has periodically attempted to broaden his appeal while maintaining the zeal of the fundamentalists. Feeling the heat of fundamental anger after the appointment of Bush, Reagan chose to intensify his appeal to the group. In August of 1980 he began his campaign to rally the Right with an appearance before the fundamentalist Religious Roundtable's national affairs briefing in Dallas. At this meeting Reagan won the enthusiastic support of the Moral Right for the 1980 campaign. In his speech he questioned the First Amendment separation

of church and state, rejected governmental tyranny over religion, attacked the Federal Communications Commission's investigations of religious broadcasters and the Internal Revenue Service's "vendetta" against Christian schools, celebrated the Ten Commandments, praised lawmakers who sought "divine guidance" in government, referred to the religious audience's "rendezvous with destiny," and criticized the theory of evolution. He ended the speech with a line that aroused a thunderous response:

> I can only add to that, my friends, that I continue to look to the scriptures today for fulfillment and for guidance. Indeed, it is an incontrovertible fact that all the complex and horrendous questions confronting us at home and worldwide have their answers in that single book.[2]

He followed this appearance with campaign speeches to religious broadcasters in Lynchburg, Virginia, where he promised Jerry Falwell that he would use the Presidency as a "bully puppet" for the moral concerns of the New Right. A few weeks later he granted an interview to Jim Bakker's PTL Club Magazine (*Action*), where he blasted the ERA and reiterated his disdain for atheism. He reassured Bakker that he would be most comfortable if surrounded by advisors who believed in God.

The landslide victory produced euphoria within New Right circles. Still, Reagan's tendency to appeal to moderates rekindled the latent tensions between the President-elect and his zealous supporters. His appointment of Howard Baker's campaign manager, James Baker, as a key White House aide along with other moderate Republican appointments again aroused criticism from the Right. In what would become common practice in the following years, Reagan followed his appeal to the moderates with a series of reassuring meetings with New Right leaders Richard Viguerie, Terry Dolan, Howard Phillips, Phyllis Schlafly, Paul Weyrich and Jesse Helms. He also entertained members of the Yaffers (Young Americans for Freedom), anti-abortion groups, anti-labor organizations, and anti-tax groups. In these meetings he promised to make more "correct" appointments as soon as possible.

Quickly honoring his promises, Reagan appointed New Right fundamentalists to key administrative positions. At Health and Human Services he nominated a fundamentalist anti-abortion crusader, Dr. C. Everett Koop. Marjory Mecklenburg, who was president of one of the nation's largest anti-abortion committees, was named director of the Office of Adolescent Pregnancy Programs. At the Department of Education the former president of the fundamentalist National Christian Action Coalition, the Rev. Robert Billings, was named a consultant and assistant to the Secretary of Education. Soon Billings was promoted to Director of the Education Department's ten regional offices as well as the special "Christian School Liaison Officer."

This was a newly created position and no counterpart for other religious denominations was considered.[3]

The Effects of the Reagan Education Policy

Whatever the intentions of the President, the effect of such appointments was dramatic. With fundamental right-wingers in powerful positions, political and educational policy in the United States began to change direction. The first step of the Reagan conservative education policy was to reduce the federal role in American schooling and grant more power to state and local governments. In the first budget submitted by the administration, cuts of $1.1 billion were sought in compensatory education for disadvantaged students and programs for handicapped and bilingual students. Congress balked at such dramatic cuts, and expenditures fell only by $500 million between fiscal 1980 and fiscal 1982. Other initial priorities for the administration included controlling spending increases for the guaranteed student loan program; the abolition of the Department of Education and its replacement with a foundation similar to the National Science Foundation; the institutionalization of tuition-tax credits for parents of children in public and private schools; and the passage of a constitutional amendment to allow for prayer in schools.[4]

In the fall of 1984 the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress issued a report on the educational impact of the budget changes of the first term of the Reagan administration. The group pointed out that the first term was marked by a pattern of fighting between Reagan and the Congress over cuts in education programs.

President Carter's $17.1 billion proposal for educational programs in fiscal 1982 was reduced to $12.6 billion by President Reagan. Congress resisted, and a $14.7 billion compromise was finally reached. For fiscal 1983 Reagan requested $9.9 billion, but Congress ultimately approved $15.4 billion. The Library of Congress reported that, after adjusting for inflation, actual educational purchasing power was reduced by 21.2 percent between fiscal 1980 and fiscal 1984. Between fiscal 1980 and fiscal 1985 federal resources for compensatory education were down 23.8 percent; block grants to states and local educational agencies were down 36.2 percent; funds for bilingual education were down 42.8 percent; monies to aid the education of more than four million students with physical and mental disabilities were down 13.9 percent; and funds for vocational education were down 33.3 percent.

While many observers have pointed out that the massive federal cutbacks feared by Reagan's opponents did not materialize during the first term, it was only the efforts of Reagan's congressional opponents that prevented such reductions in educational funding. Reagan pointed out in the 1985

campaign that funding for federal programs in education grew during his four years in office from $14.8 billion in fiscal 1981 to almost $17 billion counting the projected fiscal 1985 budget. When inflation was considered, however, funding actually suffered a loss of almost $4 billion in 1980 dollars, or a real decline of about 25 percent.[5]

Liberals and many spokespeople for poor people in America argue that the Reagan record in education reflects the lack of social concern of his supporters in the New Right. Critics have charged that Reagan's right-wing appointees have conveyed a tone of ethical indifference that illustrates an intrinsic lack of compassion for the poor. Liberals contend that the brunt of Reagan's education cuts have fallen on school systems with the largest number of economically disadvantaged and other special-needs students. In the attempt to control the growth of the guaranteed student loan program, for example, one important effect has been cutbacks in the funding of Pell grants to disadvantaged students—again presenting at least the appearance of indifference to the needs of the poor.[6]

According to the nonprofit lobbying group, the Children's Defense Fund (CDF), President Reagan's economic policies have slashed $10 billion from federal programs that help children. The CDF report, issued in January of 1984, claims that Reagan budgetary policies have dropped 700,000 children from Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid. Another 440,000 have lost education aid and thousands of mothers have been deprived of maternal and child health services. The report specifically chided Reagan for consistent cuts in federal educational aid for disadvantaged children. Overall the CDF claims that the effect of the Reagan budgets are forcing more children to live in poverty, while providing them fewer avenues for escape.[7] To add further to the liberal perception that Reagan's educational policy is indifferent to the needs of poor children, the President has made the statement in many of his talks on education that the generations who lived through the Great Depression and World War II are guilty of trying to make things too easy for children. Though the President may not have been referring to poor children when he made the observation, the statement, when combined with the pronouncements of New Right appointees, Attorney General Ed Meese's thoughts on hunger, and the reports on the effects of budget cuts, gives many Americans the impression of a politician who is callous to the needs of the economically troubled.[8]

While it is important to examine the budget priorities of the Reagan administration as part of the attempt to ascertain the social and educational vision toward which the President is moving the country, it is also revealing to examine the state of affairs within a Reagan-led executive department. By the end of Reagan's first term the Department of Education was in turmoil—the confusion has continued into the first year of Reagan's second term despite the appointment of William Bennett as the new secretary of Education.

Reagan's fundamentalist, right-wing appointees have been calling the shots at the Education Department in recent months. Rep. Pat Williams (D-Montana) commented recently concerning activities at the Department that "for 25 years I have watched the ascendency of the right-wing, and every four years they have provided comic relief. That has changed. They are now in charge." In the period since Reagan's first inauguration, the department staff have been cut by 25% and more politically oriented firings are in the offing. At the same time the number of political appointees is double what it was under the Carter administration. Overall funding is lowered by sixteen percent, women's equity programs have been terminated, and civil rights training programs and funds for Indian education are scheduled for elimination.

One liberal critic has charged that President Reagan has made the DOE a dumping ground for right-wing extremists. Leaders of the New Right now occupy positions that control management, publications, legal affairs, civil rights enforcement, research grants, and departmental planning and budget. Of the top eight political appointees under Secretary Terrell Bell, six were active in New Right politics. Never before have political appointees been put in charge of the department's ten regional offices. The President recently purged the membership of many of the department's advisory councils, which provide a forum for individuals with viewpoints which oppose the policies of the department. Appointment now rests not upon proven expertise in education, but upon ideological purity. For example, new appointees to a panel on women's educational programs included a director and a first chair who were both members of Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum.

In relation to the appointees, Secretary Terrell Bell came across as a progressive moderate. From the beginning Bell was suspect in the eyes of the right-wing fundamentalists. While the Secretary remained a team player, appearing at congressional hearings appealing for school prayer and budget cuts, the Right did not feel that his heart was in the right place. Bell further angered the New Right by firing some of his right-wing critics within the department. Bell eventually established his control over the management of the department, but much of the decision-making power remained in the hands of second-level appointees from the New Right. Frustrated by the perpetual battles, Bell finally resigned in late 1984. President Reagan has had little to say about the changes within the department. Those individuals who have directed the changes are after all his appointees.[9]

The effects of the President's right-wing appointments to the Department of Education are slowly beginning to become apparent. The relationship between the department and private schools has become closer than ever before. When more than two dozen categorical programs were consolidated into the education block grant, an arrangement was made to share books and teaching materials with private schools. These sharing arrangements have

been extended by the Reagan appointees to apply to all aspects of the block grant funding. During the Reagan years the private schools' share of federal funds has leaped from $16 million to $40 million. This private-school increase occurred at the same time that the block grant arrangement provided twelve percent less than the categorical programs in total educational expenditures.

Urban public schools have been the big losers under the Reagan Education Department. In addition to the reduced funding in general, the urban schools in America's 32 largest cities during the 1982–1983 school years gave fifteen percent of their block grant funds to private schools—in previous years that figure had been only five percent. In Philadelphia, for example, nearly one-third of the $2.3 million in block grant funds was earmarked for private schools. Critics of the administration note that, although the law requires that private schools comply with civil rights legislation before receiving federal funds, few of the private schools in question have enforced such provisions.

Another result of the New Right influence on the Department of Education has involved the enforcement of the Hatch Amendment. This legislation, adopted in 1978, requires students to obtain their parents' consent before they can participate in federally funded programs which mandate psychiatric or psychological examination. The department established the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Office to process complaints from parents about possible violations of the amendment. The possibility exists that the amendment may be interpreted to terminate programs which New Right groups believe are "alienating school children from their parents, from religious beliefs, and from our nation's patriotic heritage." Already conservative parental groups, such as Phyllis Schafly's Eagle Forum, have given many school districts lists of undesirable activities that are presumed to be forbidden by the Hatch Amendment. Some of the forbidden activities include classroom activities such as role playing and student discussion of current events.

The polarization at the Department of Education is quite disturbing to many observers. The danger exists, many critics claim, that the educational agenda of the New Right may be forced upon the American schools by way of the Department of Education. The irony of this possibility is apparent when one remembers that only a few years ago the New Right was calling for the destruction of the agency. By the summer of 1985 fewer and fewer calls for the abolition of the department were being issued from New Right circles.[10]

Reagan, the New Right, and the Call for Excellence

In the search for the real Ronald Reagan and the future of American educational policy, one thing is apparent—Reagan is a savvy and pragmatic

politician who recognizes political hay when he sees it. The report of the Commission on Excellence in Education marked a watershed in his educational policy. With the issuance of the report, the President shifted the emphasis of his educational policy—not necessarily changing his goals, but changing the vehicle for their accomplishment. On the surface the report offered the President's liberal opponents a means of attacking the Reagan education policy. Instead of decreased federal support, they argued that the President's policy of neglect and his proposals for expanded budget cuts actually contributed to the decline.

Reagan has not allowed this strategy to work; he has used the report to support the New Right thesis that federal educational involvement is the culprit. The president has promoted the document as a testament to the failure of the federal education policy of the past; in other words, he has effectively blamed the liberals and their policies for educational decline. In the eyes of the American public he has made educational excellence a part of the conservative educational agenda.

The shift in Reagan's strategy revolves around his ability to capture excellence and to place it in the conservatives' corner. Up until the late spring and summer of 1983, Ronald Reagan had said very little about the role of education in American society. In 1982 Ernest Boyer, head of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, was moved to conclude that the most serious impact of Ronald Reagan on education was the President's failure to affirm public education as an essential need for strengthening the nation. Jack Schuster, Professor of Education at the Claremont Graduate School, wrote in late 1982 that Reagan's policies were precipitating a "decline in education as a national, or societal, priority."[11] Boyer and Schuster based their opinions on the data available to them.

The only educational issues which Reagan had publicly addressed as President were prayer in schools, the abolition of the Department of Education, and tuition-tax credits. Prayer in schools was touted as the most important move that could be made to improve public education in America; the abolition of the Education Department, Reagan argued, would allow the schools to serve their constituencies by removing senseless federal regulation and by getting government off the backs of local school personnel; and tuition-tax credits would stimulate private schools and in turn improve public education through competition. After the release of *A Nation at Risk*, Reagan transcended his three-point plan for educational excellence as he began to speak of quality teaching, merit pay, better teacher training, discipline, and back to basics. It was time to turn around the liberal neglect of the past. Permissiveness, weak colleges of education, tenured lackadaisical teachers, watered-down curricula became the buzz words for liberal educational policy. The President has made the same points as his New Right supporters while carefully avoiding the labels so often used by the fundamentalist right-wingers.

In the case of his call for excellence, he has described the programs and the failure of those liberals whom the New Right refers to as the atheistic, secular humanists without ever using the term "secular humanist" himself. It is a masterful political strategy, for it allows Reagan to walk the fine line between the zealous Right and the moderate center of the political spectrum. As a result Reagan can reap the benefits of the New Right political machinery while transcending identification with their zealous extremes. The President and his advisors have accomplished a political coup d'etat—they support New Right policy without appearing to be a part of the New Right.

Liberals watched in amazement as the President turned *A Nation at Risk* into an endorsement of New Right educational goals. In a White House ceremony on April 26, 1983, Reagan told Commission on Excellence members:

> Your call for an end to federal intrusion is consistent with our task of redefining the federal role in education . . . so we'll continue to work in the months ahead for passage of tuition tax credits, vouchers, educational savings accounts, voluntary school prayer and abolishing the Department of Education.[12]

Almost immediately liberals exclaimed that the commission had not recommended these policies. The President had, in effect, issued a new report which could have been entitled, "The Commission Report According to Reagan." The late Congressman Carl D. Perkins of Kentucky polled the members of the commission and told the House of Representatives on August 4, 1983, that

> the commissioners do not support reductions in federal assistance to education . . . . The report foresees a definite and significant role for federal funding in education. The commissioners were unanimous in the belief that increased state and local funds would be necessary as well.[13]

Thus, according to the liberals Reagan distorted the spirit of the commission's report, moving the document into the camp of the New Right and its educational agenda. A nonsectarian document, they argued, was turned into support for a fundamentalist educational program of school prayer, tuition tax credits for Christian parents, and strong discipline. Anne C. Lewis, executive editor for *Education USA*, points out that the major educational issues debated during Reagan's first term were issues pushed by religious interests. The excellence movement was intertwined with New Right religious issues. Even an ostensibly neutral piece of legislation to bolster the teaching of mathematics and science was introduced with a provision giving students the right to hold end-of-day religious meetings in public schools.[14] By the 1984 campaign the evolution in the President's

educational platform was complete; his agenda was an amalgam of New Right religious concerns and a call for excellence based loosely on the report of the Commission on Excellence in Education.

The call for excellence, as Reagan has worked it, may have struck a responsive chord with the American public by eliciting some latent middle-class fears. The drift of American educational reform over the past several decades has been one of increasing egalitarianism by the expansion of the educational franchise. The 1970s and 1980s have been decades of economic scarcity, as opposed to the economic expansion and optimism of the 1950s and 1960s. Ronald Reagan was elected at a time when most Americans had finally concluded that the era of abundance had ended. In an era of economic trouble the ideal of expanding opportunity for everyone grates against the middle class's dream of success. Those already in the middle class often want avenues to material success restricted, not opened. Many of them do not want their status or their control of resources threatened by an increased access to what little there is in a depressed economy. Even when the economy displays a temporary improvement, it cannot overcome the overwhelming American feeling that our resources are limited—the perception that the great American pie is not expanding. In such a social context, our social and educational institutions retreat from their commitment to opportunity. Laws once ensuring affirmative action, desegregation, mainstreaming and the like are ignored or repealed. Those who have already made it to the middle class draw up the ladder behind them and do their best to close the door.

Ronald Reagan has been able to use the renewed call for quality to political advantage, for his position speaks directly to the status-anxious middle class. The middle class expresses its status anxiety in phrases such as "it's time we quit paying so much attention to the minorities," or "the rich get tax breaks and the government takes care of the poor, but nobody helps those in the middle." This status anxiety not only helps us explain the popularity of Ronald Reagan, but it grants insight into the recent legitimization of the socio-educational policies of the once-scorned fundamentalist Right. Indeed, it has been the Right that has consistently pushed measures to restrict governmental expansion of economic and educational opportunity to the economically disadvantaged.

Ronald Reagan and the New Right have carefullly portrayed liberal educational reform as rampant egalitarianism with an ultimate consequence of destroying quality education. The fundamentalist right-wingers have unabashedly called the liberal effort communism, because, they claim, it attempts to level society. In the process, the right-wingers argue, it is contrary to the wishes of God, for it separates reward from work. Rather than guaranteeing a person's right to achieve reward from the fruits of his labor, it is claimed that liberal educational policy has sought to legislate human equality.

Anyone who goes into modern schools, many conservatives argue, can tell that school officials and teachers have lost control. New Right critics have blamed such a loss of control on a "new progressivism" that emerged in the 1960s. The "new progressives," or romantics, saw inequality as unjust and saw its origins in external circumstances that favored one participant over another. Usually these external circumstances involved factors of culture over which, the progressives claimed, the student had little control. As a result, the New Right analysts contend, academic problems and disciplinary problems were excused as cultural aberrations and were not dealt with effectively. Academic standards declined, teacher authority was destroyed, and little was done to turn the situation around until conservatives began to call for a change. These calls for academic excellence, the New Right argues, continue to be opposed by liberal educators who see the excellence movement as an attempt to oppress minorities or to stamp out student creativity. Thus, Reagan and the right-wingers have effectively blamed school failures on liberals, in the process removing school from the social factors which influence it. By no means is this to argue that all conservatives fail to see the school in its proper social context. It does imply, however, that President Reagan and his New Right supporters often commit an error of causal oversimplification, blaming all school ills directly on what they call liberal education policy.

Ronald Reagan and the 1984 Election

In the 1984 campaign Reagan continued his policy of portraying the liberals as the purveyors of evil in the world, often reflecting the spirit of the rhetoric of the New Right. The President used strong language throughout the campaign to portray Mondale and his Democratic followers as anti-religious. The day after the Republican convention Reagan stated at a prayer breakfast that anyone who opposes the school prayer amendment is intolerant of religion. On September 4, during a speech in Utah, the President accused the liberal Democrats of favoring freedom against religion. Candidate Mondale subsequently charged Reagan with being unable to handle diversity of opinion, as he [Reagan] insults the motives of those who disagree with him.[15]

Many liberals were dismayed by the President's language at the Dallas prayer breakfast, when he stated that opponents of school prayer "refuse to tolerate prayer's importance in our lives." Such a locution rang Orwellian in the ears of certain liberals who interpreted "tolerate its importance" to mean "mandate." These same liberals maintained that Reagan was not consistent with his stated intention of promoting religion in general. If he was serious about religious objectivity, Charles Krauthammer wrote, "then he should support silent school prayer, which is denominationally neutral." Reagan's

intent, Krauthammer concluded, was to elicit favor with New Right fundamentalists "whose expressed aim is to use the cause of religion-in-general as a wedge to promote . . . its particular brand of Christian fundamentalism." Other than the school prayer issue, the candidates devoted relatively little attention to education in the post-convention phase of the campaign.[16]

The 1984 campaign clearly displayed the fact that Ronald Reagan refused to distance himself from the New Right—Reagan considered himself as much a leader of a movement as a party leader. At the Dallas convention in 1984 Reagan surprised many strategists by his harsh rhetoric and his defense of the New Right worldview. He spoke of the New Right as a dam against a flood of liberal usurpers who had been attempting to secularize America. Reagan's election campaign statements represented no break with the spirit of many of his previous utterances. In March of 1984, speaking at the National Association of Evangelicals meeting, he issued a strong attack on those "who turned to a modern day secularism." The press rarely pointed out that the President was reflecting the New Right's secular humanism theory. It seemed at times that the term "the Teflon presidency" was especially applicable in matters dealing with the New Right.[17]

Reagan's references to secular humanism were not only to be heard in public speeches to highly partisan groups. Reagan's assistant, Morton Blackwell, who was assigned as a special liaison to the New Right, disclosed that he has overheard Reagan discussing secular humanism in the White House with New Right theorist, Tim LaHaye—welcomed guest in the Reagan White House and the author of the New Right tract on education, *The Battle for the Mind*. LaHaye heads the American Coalition for Traditional Values (ACTV), which is supported by Jerry Falwell, Jimmy Swaggart, and Jim Bakker. The President received leaders of ACTV in the White House in June 1984 and has courted their financial support on numerous occasions.[18]

This courting of the New Right consistently made the President's inner circle of political advisors edgy. Some inside staffers confided that they wanted to see the church-state issue put to rest.[19] Reagan's campaign team believed that as the New Right connection became better known by the public, the President would be hurt. The leaders of the Reagan campaign tried diligently to move the focus of the campaign away from the New Right social agenda toward a less politically devisive economic orientation. Throughout Reagan's first term the senior staff felt little sympathy for the New Right's moral crusade. Conservative Edwin Meese, for example, personally and very quietly supported a pro-choice position on abortion—not a position that would endear him to Rev. LaHaye and his fellow evangelicals.

The campaign leaders had a well-planned and carefully calculated reelection strategy. The evangelical New Right and its constituency rallied the

faithful around issues like school prayer and abortion. The White House staff, understanding the divisiveness of the issues, gave the New Right token support while secretly wishing for a perpetual frustration of the New Right goals. Little substantial support was given to New Right legislation in Congress and any White House aide who pushed the New Right issues too hard lost power in the inner circle. Faith Whittlesey, the director of the Office of Public Liaison, worked fanatically for New Right goals—once making an emotional appeal to bewildered corporate leaders for tuition tax credits. She quickly lost prestige among the senior staff and became a nonentity. The flaw in this strategy was the President, for he never cooperated with the plan. Reagan served to inspire the very forces that his staffers were trying to keep under wraps. The President encouraged the movement whenever he had a chance, speaking in inspirational tones to evangelical audiences, entertaining them at the White House, and creating media-oriented photo opportunities, all against the wishes of his campaign strategists. But the President may have had the last laugh.[20]

By moving into the unchartered waters of religious politics, Ronald Reagan occupied an area never before claimed. The traditional response to the religion and politics issue has been to ignore it. Jimmy Carter may have claimed status as a born-again Christian, but he chose to stay away from the specific political implications of such a stance. Thus, as a national political figure, Reagan has stood alone as the politician as religious activist. This has certainly alienated a corps of civil libertarians, but, more importantly, it has created a cadre of zealous supporters from the New Right and religious organizations marginally associated with it, who see Reagan not just as a popular political figure, but as a moral leader. It was Ronald Reagan who was the first national political leader in modern times to speak for prayer in the schools, to advocate anti-abortion sentiments sincerely, to talk unembarrassedly about stricter discipline in schools, and to affirm the rights of Christian people to get governmental support for removing their children from the morally degenerate public school system.

These themes play well to rural and transplanted rural voters who harbor fundamentalist religious viewpoints and who find themselves in the lower or lower-middle socioeconomic classes. A key element in Reagan's political success has been that these groups have traditionally been Democratic constituencies. William Schneider of the American Enterprise Institute maintains that, since the President cannot appeal to these voters on economic grounds, Reagan's religious and nationalistic themes have worked especially well. Thus, the President has had it both ways—appealing to traditional Republican constituencies on the rational economic level and appealing to traditional Democratic constituencies on the emotional religious level.[21]

The real Ronald Reagan continues to be elusive, but it is apparent that, at

the very least, Reagan is personally comfortable with the social and educational views of the right-wing fundamentalists. He has given lip service to the theological side of the movement, but his commitment here is marked by ambiguity. Through his appointments Reagan has pushed American politics toward the right. Through these same appointments Reagan continues to move American education toward the fundamentalist conservative vision of what schools should be.

Government by committee has worked well for Ronald Reagan. He has maintained his distance from divisive, emotional issues, while retaining an unprecedented popularity with the American public. In the process the New Right has profited. With Ronald Reagan the right-wing fundamentalists have achieved respectability and power far beyond their dreams of a decade ago. The post-Reagan future of the New Right may have clouds on its horizon, but the New Right approaches that future in a position of power. The power has been bestowed by Ronald Reagan.

3 What Should the Federal Government Do to Deal with the Problem of AIDS?

The Reagan Administration's Response

WHEN A MEMO TITLED "What should the federal government do to deal with the problem of AIDS?" crossed Carl Anderson's desk, the special assistant for the Office of Public Liaison (OPL) in the Reagan White House changed the content of the text with one stroke of his pen. Initially drafted by the Working Group on Health Policy (WGHP) in September 1985, a committee with representatives from the Departments of Justice, State, and Health and Human Services (HHS), the document laid out a course of action to deal with the then four-year-old AIDS epidemic. The WGHP concluded that the White House needed to sponsor a major public education campaign that addressed AIDS as "a public health problem" but that also considered "the civil rights and needs of individuals." A month later, Anderson, the first White House staffer to edit this memo, deleted the civil rights phrase and inserted a call for the publication of a "special report on AIDS, and enhanced public information efforts."[1] Anderson sent his version of the document to the Domestic Policy Council (DPC), the presidential domestic advisory board, for vetting.

On December 19, 1985, the DPC reviewed the memo in a meeting that was both typical and atypical for that advisory body. As was usually the case with DPC meetings, about a dozen Reagan administration officials, including representatives from the Departments of Education, Labor, and HHS, participated in discussions about domestic issues. But the meeting was unusual in two ways: first, President Reagan attended the session; second, the agenda included a discussion of the AIDS epidemic. The DPC meeting held at the end of 1985 was only the fifth time the advisory body had discussed AIDS, and it was the only time, up to that point, that Reagan

had attended a session with AIDS on the agenda.[2] In the middle of the meeting, President Reagan commented that "AIDS must be dealt with as a major *public* health problem," echoing the phrase in the memo and subtly eliding the civil rights approach. Most of the DPC members agreed and called on all individuals to take responsibility for their actions. Notably, the representative from the Department of Education, Gary Bauer, the undersecretary for education, flagged the lack of "emphasis on personal responsibility" in "booklets developed for students" as a problem that the federal government needed to address. The meeting ended with the DPC strongly recommending that the president sign the revised memo. Three days later he did just that: in the last days of 1985, Reagan initialed the final version of "What should the federal government do to deal with the problem of AIDS?" He authorized federal agencies and state and local governments "to take all necessary steps to lessen the risks of the spread of AIDS" and to treat AIDS as a public health problem in need of "a special report on AIDS."[3]

Department of Health and Human Services, the agency that would ultimately oversee the writing of the report, requested that the president take an entirely different kind of action on AIDS. HHS proposed that Reagan sign Executive Order No. 12291, a rule that sought to add AIDS to the list of Dangerous Contagious Diseases. With AIDS on this list, the State Department could deny visas to applicants with AIDS and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could prevent any potential immigrant with AIDS from entering the country.[4] While the decision to adopt this policy would not take effect for another year and a half, the simultaneity of these events suggests that the Reagan administration considered the development of domestic AIDS policy in concert with AIDS policies that affected people outside the United States.

Contemporary critics of the Reagan administration's AIDS policy criticized it for failing to address the actual scope of the epidemic, particularly as it manifested itself in the United States. The most widely read of those attacks, journalist Randy Shilts's *And the Band Played On*, published in 1987, cited numerous examples of how Reagan's first-term administration refused to fund AIDS programs.[5] Shilts assigned the failure to address AIDS to the rise of the New Right, the administration's desire to shrink the welfare state, and the consistent demonization of homosexuality by modern conservatives.[6] Almost every review of the best-selling book highlighted

Historical accounts of the AIDS epidemic, Ronald Reagan's presidency, and the rise of the New Right have echoed Shilts and his reviewers. These explanations would have us believe that this chapter's opening vignettes, particularly the first one, which showed how slow Reagan was to act on AIDS, typified his administration's response to AIDS. Most historians have argued that Reagan all but ignored the epidemic. Pointing to Reagan's slow start on AIDS — he did not sign a document dealing with AIDS until the end of 1985, did not mention the term "AIDS" in public until 1986, and spent very little money on researching the epidemic even though the first reported cases of AIDS coincided precisely with Reagan's first months in office — most authors writing about him omit anything but a passing reference to AIDS and Ronald Reagan.[8]

Instead of discussing AIDS, historical accounts of the politics of the 1980s describe the ways the New Right came to power, in part, through a reaction to gay rights and AIDS. According to historian Sara Diamond, "The onset of the Reagan era brought unity to the Right's disparate elements. New Right think tanks and electoral projects promoted a three-fold set of priorities: anticommunist militarism, supply-side economics, and 'traditional family values.'"[9] On this point, theorists whose work makes up the interdisciplinary history of AIDS agree, arguing that Reagan failed to act on AIDS because of his commitment to the New Right, which required a moralistic stance against gays and lesbians and drug users, the people most associated with AIDS. Ultimately, both sets of scholars argue that the administration's response to AIDS was part of its larger conservative attack on the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which had loosely united to extend civil rights to racial, gender, and sexual minorities.[10]

While I agree that the Reagan administration's sluggishness in responding to AIDS must be documented and reiterated for us to have a full account of the political history of the 1980s, the historical record points to a more complicated, and internally contradictory, administrative reaction to AIDS after 1985. Focusing on the administration's rhetoric, as articulated by the officials charged with plotting a course to deal with AIDS, to the exclusion of understanding what the government actually produced once it acknowledged the necessity of action prevents us from seeing that a conservative, morally driven ideology about AIDS was not all-powerful in this period. This chapter will argue that putting AIDS at the center of

a historical analysis of Reagan's presidency unsettles our understanding of modern conservatism previously understood by historians and other analysts as a movement that brought together people who defended "family values" with those who called for laissez-faire economic policy and anticommunism.

Careful attention to the historical narrative of how the administration responded to AIDS suggests that the federal government's decision to design an AIDS prevention strategy produced splits and disagreements among political appointees in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas. When it came to the making of domestic AIDS education, on one hand, education and religion advisors to the president, namely, Gary Bauer, William Bennett, and Carl Anderson, steered the administration toward a morality-based AIDS initiative that shunned homosexuality and hailed abstinence and heterosexual marriage as the only forms of effective AIDS prevention. On the other hand, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and Admiral James Watkins, the head of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic (Presidential Commission on HIV), fundamentally disagreed with Bauer, Bennett, and Anderson. Koop argued that to address AIDS required a commitment to rational science and Christianity as well as explicit discussions of sexual practice, drug use, and condom distribution. The presidential commission, under Watkins's leadership, presented sharp criticisms of the eviscerated welfare state, a position that put the commission in direct opposition to those who called for economic conservatism in the form of less governmental spending. While all of these men considered themselves religious and conservative, the stances of Koop and Watkins infuriated Bauer, Bennett, and Anderson, three of the leading religious conservatives in Reagan's administration.[1]

Beyond the disagreements AIDS exposed among social conservatives working on domestic policy, it also produced splits within the administration over how to incorporate a response to AIDS in a foreign policy based almost entirely on anticommunism and containment of the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1986, when the administration began to act on the foreign policy implications of AIDS by instituting an immigration policy that excluded potential immigrants with AIDS, foreign policy specialists who worked at the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency criticized attempts to control the spread of AIDS within the United States by keeping immigrants with AIDS outside the borders as well as the administration's apprehension about condom distribution. The State Depart-